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Abstract 
 
 
A dynamic stochastic general equilibrium monetary model with incomplete and imperfect asset 
markets, monopolistic competition and staggered nominal price rigidities is developed to shed 
light on the role of exchange rate and its relation with current account dynamics in the 
formulation of monetary-exchange rate policies. The paper shows that because of incomplete 
risk sharing, due to incomplete asset markets, the dynamic relationship between real exchange 
rate and net foreign assets affect the behaviour of domestic inflation and aggregate output. This, 
in turn, implies that the optimal monetary policy should entail a response to net foreign asset 
position or the real exchange rate gap defined as the difference between actual real exchange rate 
and the value that would prevail with flexible prices and complete asset markets. In comparing 
the performance of alternative monetary-exchange rate policy rules, an interesting and fairly 
robust result that stands out is that ‘dirty floating’ out-performs flexible exchange rate regime 
with domestic inflation targeting.   
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1 - Introduction 
Traditionally, the effects of monetary policy on aggregate economic activity in an open economy 
setting have been largely studied within the framework developed by Mundell (1963), Fleming (1962) 
and Dornbusch (1976). Although the Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch (MFD) framework has played a 
dominant role in shaping the literature on open economy macroeconomics (largely due to its empirical 
success and popularity among policy makers), it has certain important methodological drawbacks. These 
include lack of microfoundations for the aggregate macroeconomic relationships, inability to provide 
well-defined welfare criteria by which to evaluate the effectiveness of alternative macroeconomic 
policies, disregard of the role of the intertemporal budget constraints, which is central in the analysis of 
the current account and exchange rate dynamics, and failure to provide an explicit account of how 
monetary policy affects firm’s production and price-setting decisions.  
Beginning with the seminal contribution by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995a,1996), considerable 
amount of research (labelled as ‘New Open Economy Macroeconomics’ (NOEM)1) has been done to 
overcome these drawbacks. The highlighting features of a typical NOEM model are dynamic general 
equilibrium framework as the workhorse of analysis, staggered price-setting structure, and the use of 
nominal interest rate as an instrument of monetary policy. Examples of this literature include Clarida, 
Gali and Gertler (2001), Gali and Monacelli (2002), Monacelli (2000), McCallum and Nelson (2000), 
Walsh (1999), and many others. Some of the important and widely accepted results of this literature on 
optimal monetary policy in an open economy setting are provided by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2001) and 
Gali and Monacelli (2002). For instance, they claim that under certain standard conditions domestic 
inflation targeting is the optimal monetary policy and that the central bank should not respond to 
exchange rate movements, that is, it should allow the exchange rate to float freely. Moreover, there is no 
role for current account dynamics and the welfare criterion or the objective function of the central bank 
just includes targeting domestic inflation and output around the ‘flexible-price’ optimal value.  
The contribution of this paper is that it provides new insights to the questions pertaining to the 
conduct of monetary policy in an open economy by clarifying the role of exchange rate and its relation 
with current accounts in a dynamic general equilibrium model with incomplete and imperfect asset 
markets, monopolistic competition, and staggered nominal price rigidities. In particular, the paper 
explicitly captures the interaction of current account dynamics with key macroeconomic variables, 
analyzes their implications for the monetary-exchange rate policy, and demonstrates that the welfare-
enhancing monetary policy implies a dirty float under domestic inflation targeting.  
 
                                                 
1A number of articles provide detailed and critical survey of this literature. For example, Sarno (2001), Lane (2001), 
Bowman and Doyle (2003) and VanHoose (2004).  
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The debate over the role of exchange rate in the formulation of monetary policy is far from being 
settled. Numerous issues have been considered in the NOEM literature in this regard. For instance, it 
depends on the currency in which firms set their prices. If firms set their prices in the seller’s currency, 
known as producer currency pricing (PCP), then a number of researchers such as Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(1995a), Gali and Monacelli (2002), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2001), Engel (2002), Corsetti and Pesenti 
(2001a, 2001b) and Sutherland (2000, 2002) have shown that the monetary authority should only target 
domestic prices and let the exchange rate float. On the other hand, if firms are assumed to set their prices 
in the buyer’s currency, known as local currency pricing (LCP) , then the domestic price level remains 
completely unaffected by exchange rate movements and therefore to ensure complete risk sharing the 
monetary authority should keep the exchange rate fixed (Betts and Devereux (2000), Devereux and Engle 
(2000, 2002)). Other variations in this debate include traded versus non-traded goods (Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (2000, 2002)), complete versus incomplete exchange rate pass-through (Corsetti and Pesenti 
(2001b), Sutherland (2002), Smets and Wouters (2002), and domestic versus CPI inflation targeting 
(Svensson (2000)). It is important to note, however, that most of this literature ignores the dynamics of 
current account or net foreign assets.  
It seems that the key motivation to shut down the current account channel as a dynamic shock-
propagation mechanism is to keep the analysis simple. This is accomplished by either incorporating the 
complete asset markets assumption2 (e.g., Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2001), Gali and Monacelli (2002), 
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (1998) and Devereux and Engel (2000)) or by imposing a unitary elasticity 
of substitution between domestic and foreign goods3 (e.g., Corsetti and Pesenti (2001a, 2001b), Tille 
(2001)). However, as pointed out by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995b), the assumption of complete asset 
markets is not realistic in a model with imperfections and rigidities in goods market because with nominal 
rigidities monetary policy will affect real variables including the current account. Thus, with incomplete 
asset markets the dynamics of current account do matter for monetary policy because then, besides 
dealing with the distortions created by monopolistic competition, the central bank need to address the 
inefficiencies caused by incomplete asset markets.  Moreover, in an empirical paper, Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2002) link net foreign asset positions to long-run values of real exchange rates and suggest that 
optimal monetary policy responses may depend on the movements in the current account. 
                                                 
2 Complete asset markets mean that economic agents are able to trade as many state-contingent assets as there are 
future states of nature thus insuring themselves against any type of risk or shock that may hit the economy. Thus, complete risk 
pooling takes place among countries and there will be no gains from intertemporal trade. That is, current account remains 
unaffected. 
3 A unit elasticity of substitution implies that expenditures on domestic and foreign goods incurred by the economic 
agents are constant leading to constant export revenues. This implies that if the current account begins in balance, it remains in 
balance. The advantage of this approach is that we can solve the model without resorting to log-linearization. 
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Based on these observations, I incorporate incomplete asset markets by assuming that domestic 
economic agents have access to a one-period risk-less (non-contingent) domestic bond and a foreign 
bond4. Thus, all country specific shocks/risks cannot be fully insured against, so there is a possibility that 
current account imbalances may occur. It is important to note, however, that in all future periods after a 
shock the consumption differential between countries follows a random walk meaning that there is no 
well defined endogenously determined unique steady-state. Since there is a possibility of an infinite 
number of steady-state equilibria, log-linearization of the model is also problematic and can be very 
inaccurate (Kim and Kose, 2001) because one would be approximating the dynamics of the model around 
a moving steady state. In order to explore the implications of current account dynamics for other 
macroeconomic variables and monetary policy, while maintaining a unique steady-state, I incorporate an 
endogenous risk premium that depends on the domestic country’s net foreign asset position. Examples of 
this approach include Benigno (2001), and Selaive and Tuesta (2003).5   
The main result of the paper is that managed exchange rate regime (dirty floating) is superior to 
flexible exchange rate regime under domestic inflation targeting. The central bank faces no trade-off 
between stabilizing the real exchange rate and domestic inflation and output gap. Volatility in both output 
and domestic inflation goes down and so does the volatility in real exchange rate thus improving social 
welfare. However, it is important to note that as the central bank tries to stabilize the real exchange rate 
‘too much’, that is, approaches fixed exchange rate case, welfare decreases. Thus, the analysis does not 
imply that policy should always aim to eliminate exchange rate gaps. Some exchange rate gap may well 
be necessary to avoid large output gaps. The key reason behind this unconventional yet important result is 
the presence of current account dynamics affecting not only the real exchange rate behaviour via 
imperfect risk sharing due to incomplete asset markets, but also the output gap via the risk premium term 
in the interest parity relationship. This result is quite robust and holds regardless of the welfare criterion 
used: whether it includes real exchange rate movements, or focuses only on output gap and inflation 
movements. Also, the result remains unchanged whether the central bank adopts flexible inflation 
targeting or strict inflation targeting.  
                                                 
4 An alternative method of introducing incomplete asset markets is to assume that the economic agents have access to 
state-contingent assets that have nominal rather than real pay-offs. Markets are considered incomplete in the sense that agents can 
not undo the effects of sticky prices. (see, Devereux and Engel (2001) and Engel (2002)). 
5 Other approaches include Mendoza (1991), which assume that the rate of time preference is a decreasing function of 
consumption; Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001a), Kollmann (2001), and Bergin (2002), which assume an exogenous risk premium 
term; Smets and Wouters (2002), which incorporate Blanchard’s (1985) overlapping generations model in which domestic agents 
face a non-zero probability of death at each point in time; Ghironi (2001) and Cavallo and Ghironi (2002), which uses Weil’s 
(1989) specification of an overlaepping generation set-up (where agents are born on different dates with no assets) to attain 
determinacy. The choice among different stationarity-generating approaches is quite adhoc and difficult to distinguish 
quantitatively as shown by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001b).  
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 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the dynamic general equilibrium 
model elaborating the behaviour of households and firms and incorporates incomplete asset markets and 
staggered nominal price rigidities. Section 3 linearizes the optimality conditions around the steady state 
and expresses the dynamics of key macroeconomic variables such as output, domestic inflation, real 
exchange rate, and current account. Section 4 studies the behaviour of the monetary authority and 
discusses the welfare criterion --- the optimal monetary policy --- in addition to alternative monetary-
exchange rate policy rules. Section 5 calibrates the model and analyzes the performance of domestic and 
CPI inflation targeting (both flexible and strict) with varying degree of exchange rate flexibility under 
taste and foreign output shocks. Section 6 summarizes and provides concluding remarks.   
 
2 - The Model 
There are three types of economic agents in the economy: households, firms, and the monetary 
authority. Given their preferences, households decide how much to consume (both domestically produced 
goods and imported goods) and how to allocate time between leisure and work. The firms, operating in a 
monopolistically competitive environment, take two decisions: how much to produce using the labour 
services of the households and how to set the price for their output. The monetary authority issues money 
and employs nominal interest rates as an instrument of monetary policy to achieve well-specified goals. 
 
2.1 – Households 
The economy consists of a continuum of identical households. The model is described in terms of 
a representative household making decisions in the presence of uncertainties about the future with 
preferences defined over a composite consumption good tC , a taste shock tu , and leisure tN−1 . This 
representative household seeks to maximize the expected present discounted value of utility:   
∑∞
=
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+
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+ ⎥⎦
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+−−0
11
11k
ktkttk
t
NCuE φψσβ
φσ
                                                      (1) 
where ‘β’ captures rate of time preference, ‘σ’ represents the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, ‘φ’ is 
the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure, and thus measures the elasticity of labour 
supply, and ‘ξ’ is the interest rate elasticity of money demand. All parameters are assumed to be positive.  
The composite consumption index is a function of domestic and foreign goods, and is defined as: 
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where ‘η ’ is a measure of the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods and 
parameter ‘ a ’ represents the share of foreign (imported) goods in the consumption index. I assume that 
consumption is differentiated at the individual goods level. Thus, the domestic and foreign goods 
consumption indices, tHC , and tFC ,  respectively, can be written as CES (constant elasticity of 
substitution) aggregators of the quantities consumed of each type of good: 
11
0
1
,, )(
−−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ∫ ε
ε
ε
ε
djjCC tHtH  and 
11
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−−
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⎞
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⎛= ∫ ε
ε
ε
ε
djjCC tFtF , where ‘ε’ is the elasticity of substitution within each category.6 
By maximizing equation (2) subject to the total expenditure on home and foreign goods, I can 
derive the demand functions for home and foreign consumption goods. The total expenditure equation can 
be written as: tFtFtHtHt CPCPZ ,,,, += . The optimality condition yields the following equations: 
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where tP  is the overall price index (CPI) and is given as:  
  [ ] ηηη −−− +−= 111,1,)1( tFtHt aPPaP                         (5) 
In the rest of the world a representative household faces a problem identical to the domestic 
household’s problem. It is assumed that a foreign household’s utility function is analogous to that of a 
domestic household with the exception that foreign households do not face any taste shocks. Thus, 
relationships similar to equation (3) and (4) hold for the foreign country. Following Gali and Gertler 
                                                 
6 The demand functions for goods within each category can be determined by maximizing tHC , and tFC , expressions 
individually, with respect to the total expenditure on the respective category of good, given as ∫= 1
0
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where tHP ,  and tFP ,  are the price indices for domestic and foreign (imported) goods respectively that satisfy the expenditure 
equations that can be expressed as tHtHtH CPZ ,,, =  and tFtFtF CPZ ,,, = . The expressions for tHP ,  and tFP ,  are given as: 
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(2002), I assume that the foreign country is very large relative to the domestic economy. One way to think 
of it is to consider the foreign country as the rest of the world. This assumption implies that the share of 
domestic goods consumed by the rest of the world is negligible; so ∗∗ = ttF PP ,  as 0→∗a , ‘ ∗a ’ being the 
share of foreign goods (domestic economy’s exports) in the overall consumption index of the foreign 
country.  Thus, I can write the relationship linking the terms of trade and the real exchange rate as: 
  
t
tH
tt P
P
ToTQ ,=                           (6) 
where the real exchange rate is defined as:
t
tt
t P
PSQ
∗
=  and the terms of trade (the price of imported goods 
relative to domestic goods) is defined as:
tH
tFt
tH
tF
t P
PS
P
P
ToT
,
,
,
,
∗
== . tS  is the nominal exchange rate.   
In nominal terms the representative household ‘ h ’s intertemporal budget constraint is given as7:  
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The left hand side represents the resources the consumer has at his disposal at the beginning of 
period t. These consist of wage earnings ht
h
t NW , obtained by supplying labour services to the firm, 
transfers httTRP  from the monetary authority, share of profits 
h
ttPΠ  from firms’, amount of money htM 1−  
held, the amount of one-period risk-free domestic bonds h tHB 1, − , and the amount of one-period risk-free 
foreign currency denominated bonds h tFB 1, −  purchased. The right hand side corresponds to the uses of 
these resources. The household can use these to consume goods, acquire new money balances or purchase 
new bonds. The important point to note is that the price of foreign currency denominated bond is 
proportional to its gross nominal interest rate, ∗+ ti1( ). Following Benigno (2001) and Selaive and Tuesta 
(2003), (.)φ  is assumed to be a decreasing function of the economy’s stock of real foreign assets, 
ttFtt PBSb ,= , and is given as: 
 )1()( −= − tbbt eb κφ                                         (8) 
where, κ  is some constant and b  is the steady state level of real foreign assets. Thus, (.)φ  is the risk 
                                                 
7 It can be assumed that the initial wealth is the same across all the domestic economy’s households and that they all 
work for all the firms sharing the profits in equal proportion. This set of assumptions implies that all the households in the 
domestic economy face the same budget constraint and that in their consumption decision will choose the same consumption 
path. Thus, I can drop the index h and consider a representative household’s behaviour. 
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premium term representing the cost of participating in the international assets market and allows us to 
obtain a well-defined steady state.  
The following optimality conditions (derived by maximizing equation (1) subject to equation (7)) 
must hold for this household in equilibrium:  
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Equation (9) is the standard Euler equation for the holding of domestic bond. It has the usual 
interpretation that at a utility maximum, the household cannot gain from feasible shifts of consumption 
between periods. Similarly, equation (10) is the efficiency condition for the holding of foreign bonds. 
Equation (11) represents the labour supply decision. Equation (12) represents the resource constraint of 
the domestic economy, which is obtained by aggregating the equilibrium budget constraint of the 
households with that of the government.8   
By combining equations (9) and (10), I can derive, after some approximations, the familiar 
uncovered interest parity condition depicting the optimal portfolio choices of the economic agent:  
 ( )
t
t
tttt S
SEbii 1)1()1( +∗+=+ φ                                      (13)  
 Analogous to the domestic household’s optimization problem, similar optimality conditions holds 
for the representative household in the foreign country. For example, the counterpart of equation (9) can 
be written as: 
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 8 Assuming no government spending and imposing the condition that domestic bonds are in zero-net supply implies 
that for the government budget constraint to hold, all the seignorage revenue associated with money creation must be returned to 
the households in the form of lump-sum transfers in each period, that is, tttt TRPMM =− −1 .Also, in equilibrium, we 
have: ∗∗+=Π+ tHtHttHtHtttt CPeCPPNW ,,,,              
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Combining equation (14) with (10) and using the definition of real exchange rate yields the 
following relationship: 
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This equilibrium condition reflects how the representative households in each country share 
consumption risk. An important point to note is that both the interest parity relationship (equation (13)) 
and the international risk-sharing equilibrium condition (equation 15)) are affected by net foreign asset 
position of domestic households. 
 
2.2- Firms 
In order to clearly explain the mechanics of monopolistic competition in a dynamic general 
equilibrium setting I define two types of firms. The first operates in a monopolistically competitive 
environment and are called intermediate-good-producing firms, and the other operates in competitive 
markets and are called final-good-producing firms. In maximizing their profits, a representative 
intermediate-good-producing firm ‘ j ’ is subject to a number of constraints. First is the specification of 
the production function. Following McCallum and Nelson (1999), I assume that there is no capital in the 
economy and so the firm only employs the labour input, )( jNt , supplied by households to produce the 
differentiated good: 
  )()( jNAjY ttt =                                       (16) 
where )( jYt  is the intermediate-good produced by firm ‘ j ’, and )exp( tt zA =  where ‘ tz ’ represents 
aggregate technology shock. 
The representative firm ‘ j ’ supplies her output to the final good-producers. If the output of the 
final good, which is produced by using the inputs supplied by a continuum of intermediate-goods-
producing firms indexed by ]1,0[∈j , is denoted by tY , then the production function for the final output 
can be written as: 
11
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djjYY tt . Profit maximization by final-goods-producers 
(maximize: ∫− 1
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,, )()( djjYjPYP ttHttH ) yields the input demand function: t
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ε−
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,
, )()( . This input demand 
function describes the second constraint faced by intermediate-goods-producing firm ‘ j ’.  
The third constraint introduces staggered price adjustment behaviour based on Calvo (1983). 
Firms are assumed to face a constant probability ρ−1  in every period to alter their price in an optimal 
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fashion. This probability is independent of how long their prices have been fixed, therefore, the fraction 
of firms adjusting price optimally in a period is equal to the probability of price adjustment ρ−1 . The 
remaining fraction of firms ‘ρ ’ do not adjust their price. Thus, the parameter ‘ ρ ’ captures the degree of 
nominal price rigidity. 
To facilitate the tractability of the model, I assume initially that all firms are able to adjust their 
prices every period, that is, the third constraint is not binding yet.9 Then, the profit function for a 
representative firm ‘ j ’ can be written as: 
  )()()()( ,, jNWjYjPj ttttHtH −=π                              (17) 
The differentiated-good-producing firm chooses )(, jP tH  and )( jNt  to maximize these profits 
subject to the conditional demand for their variety of output and the production function. The expressions 
for )(, jP tH  and )( jNt  are given respectively as: 
  ttH MCjP 1
)(, −= ε
ε
                          (18) 
and  N
tH
t F
jP
W
ε
ε 1
)(,
−=                           (19) 
where υε
ε =⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−1  is the constant mark-up and tMC is the minimized nominal marginal cost. NF  is the 
marginal product of labour which, given the production function, is simply tA .  
Equation (18) depicts the relationship between the ‘flexible’ price chosen by all firms and the 
minimized marginal cost of production under monopolistic competition; it does not say anything about 
prices being sticky. Combining equation (18) and (19) I can write the expression for minimized nominal 
marginal cost as: 
  
t
t
t A
WMC =                                         (20) 
Price stickiness is introduced by assuming that price adjustment does not take place 
simultaneously for all firms. Following Rotemberg (1987), suppose that a representative firm ‘ j ’ that is 
allowed to change its price, set its price to minimize the expected present discounted value of deviations 
between the price it sets and the minimized nominal marginal cost. 
                                                 
9 Put differently, I assume that firm’s price-setting decisions are completely independent from their factor demand 
decisions. One way to interpret this separation of decisions is to think of firms as having two departments; one that decides what 
price to set each period, and the other that decides how much output to produce taking the prices of the inputs as given. 
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−∑ βρ                                         (21) 
where tMC  is the minimized nominal marginal cost. Note that there are two parts to discounting. The 
first, β represents a conventional discount factor, and the second, ρ  reflects the fact that the firm that has 
not adjusted its price after ‘ k ’ periods, still has the same price in period kt +  that she set in period t . 
The first order condition with respect to )(, jP tH  gives the following optimal value denoted by )(
~
, jP tH :
10 
  1,,
~)1(~ ++−= tHtttH PEMCP ρβρβ                              (22) 
Thus, the optimally chosen price in period t is a weighted average of nominal marginal cost and 
expected value of optimal price in the future. However, in period t, only a fraction ρ−1  of firms set their 
price according to equation (30). The remaining firms are stuck with the prices set in previous periods. 
Since the fraction of firms that are able to optimally set their price is randomly chosen, the average price 
of the previous period will be the price of the fraction of firms that are unable to adjust their price this 
period. Therefore, the overall aggregate price level in period t is a weighted average of current optimally 
chosen and past prices.  
εεε ρρ −−−− −+= 1
1
,
1
1,
1
, ]
~)1([ tHtHtH PPP                         (23) 
where tHP ,
~  is the price chosen by all adjusting domestic firms in period t. 
 
3- Log-linearized Model 
In this section, the model is log-linearized around the steady state. A variable in lower case 
represent the log deviation with respect to the steady state. In equilibrium firms are assumed to be 
symmetric and taking identical decisions. This implies that prices are equal for each variety of good; that 
is, tFtFtHtH PjPPjP ,,,, )(,)( == .  
 
3.1 – Output Dynamics: the new IS-curve 
Assuming that the economy’s output is can either be consumed domestically or exported to the 
rest of the world, I can write: ∗+= tHtHt CCY ,, . Log-linearizing around the steady state gives: 
  ∗+−= tHtHt accay ,,)1(                          (24) 
                                                 
           10 It is reasonable to set tHtH PjP ,,
~)(~ =  because all firms are identical except for the timing of their price adjustment. 
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where, parameter ‘ a ’, captures the share of the exports in aggregate output.   
Similarly, the log-linearized version of equation (2) can be written as: 
  tFtHt accac ,,)1( −−=                           (25) 
Now, consider equation (3) and (4) --- the demand curves for the domestic and foreign goods. 
The log-linearized version of the two equations are: )( ,, ttHttH ppcc −−= η and 
)( ,, ttFttF ppcc −−= η , where the price differentials are given as: tttH totapp )(, −=−  and 
tttF totapp ))(1(, −=−   derived by using the  log-linear version of equation (5), 
tFtHt appap ,,)1( +−= , and the log-linear version of the definition of the terms of trade, 
tHtFt pptot ,, −= . Moreover, the log-linearized version of equation (6) is given as: tt totaq ))(1( −= . 
Thus, using these relationships I can derive a simple expression linking the two demand curves: 
  ttFtH qa
cc ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−=− 1,,
η
                          (26) 
Noting that as 0→∗a , ∗∗∗ == tttF ycc ,  , an expression analogous to equation (26) for the rest of 
the world can be derived: 
  tttH qa
yc ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−=−
∗∗
1,
η
                           (27) 
Combining equations (24) – (27), I can write: 
  tttt qa
aaaycay ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−
−++−= ∗
1
)2()1( η                                     (28) 
Thus, domestic output is a weighted average of domestic and foreign expenditures, plus an ‘expenditure-
switching factor’ which is proportional to the real exchange rate. 
In order to derive an IS-type relationship that relates output the real interest rate, I need to make 
use of the Euler equations for domestic consumption (equation (9)), foreign consumption (equation (14)) 
and the uncovered interest parity condition (equation (13)). The log-linearized versions of these 
relationships are: 
  ( )ttttttHtttt uuEqEa
aicEc −−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ ∆⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−+−−= ++++ 111,1
1
1
1
σπσ         (29) 
  [ ]∗+∗∗+∗ −−= 11 1 tttttt EiyEy πσ                               (30) 
  tttttttHt bqEa
Eii κππ −∆⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−+−=− +
∗
+
∗
+ 111, 1
1
          (31) 
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Note that in deriving equation (29) and (30), I have used the relationship between CPI inflation, tπ , and 
domestic inflation, Hπ , given as: ttHt qa
a ∆⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−+= 1,ππ . 
Thus, after substituting equations (29) – (31) in equation (28), I get a relationship that resembles 
an IS equation: 
( ) ( ) ( )ttttttttHttttt uuEabawEiwEiwyEy −⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −−⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ +−−⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛+−⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ +−= +∗+∗++ 111,1 11 σσκπσπσ        (32) 
where,  )1)(2( −−= ησaaw  
Following Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2001), let 0ttt yyx −=  be defined as the output gap, where 
0
ty  is the level of output that arises with perfectly flexible prices. Similarly, let 
0
tr  and 
∗
tr  be the real 
interest rates for the domestic and foreign economy respectively that arise in the frictionless equilibrium. 
Also, 0tb (which equals zero) corresponds to the net asset holdings in the complete asset market case.  
Then, I can write equation (32) as: 
  tttHttttt b
awrEiwxEx ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +−−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +−= ++ σκπσ )(
1 0
1,1                      (33) 
where, 
  ( )tttttttt uuEw
ar
w
wyyE
w
r −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+
−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
++−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+= ++ 1
*00
1
0
1
1
1
)(
1
σ
                            (34) 
The expression for 0ty  can be calculated by equating log-linear expression for labour demand 
(equation (19)), ttHt zpw =− ,  with the log-linear expression for labour supply, (equation 
(11)), ttttt uncpw −+=− φσ , and using production function (equation (16)), ttt nzy += , the 
relationship, tttH qa
app ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−−=− 1, , and the resource constraint (equation (28)) to eliminate tc  and tn . 
( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
++⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−++⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−+
−= ∗ ttttt uqa
awy
a
az
a
ay 02
0
)1(1
1
)1(
1 σφφσ                     (35) 
0
tq  is the real exchange rate under flexible prices and complete asset markets, and is derived below. 
 
3.2 – Domestic Inflation Dynamics --- the new Phillips curve 
The log-linearized version of equation (22), 1,,,
~))(1(~ +++−= tHttHttH pEpmcp ρβρβ  ( tmc  
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stands for minimized real marginal costs) and equation (23), tHtHtH ppp ,1,, )1( ρρ −+= − , can be 
combined to produce the following Phillips curve type relationship: 
ttHttH mcE θπβπ += +1,,                          (36) 
where  ρ
ρβρθ )1)(1( −−=  
The expression for tmc  can be had by combining the log-linear expressions for equation (20) 
(expressed in real terms), ttHtt zpwmc −−= , , labour supply equation (equation (11)): 
ttttt uncpw −+=− φσ , production function (equation (16)), ttt nzy += , the relationship, 
tttH qa
app ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−−=− 1, , and the resource constraint (equation (28)):     
  ( ) tttttt uzqa
awy
a
ay
a
mc −+−⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
+−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +−=
∗ φσφσ 1
)1(11 2
                    (37) 
Note that by setting 0=tmc , I get the same expression for 0ty  given in equation (35) above. 
Thus, subtracting equation (37) from equation (35), I can write: 
  ( )02)1(1 tttt qqaawxamc −⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
+−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +−= θφ
σ
                       (38) 
Equation (55), therefore, can be written as: 
  += +1,, tHttH E πβπ  ( )02)1(1 ttt qqaawxa −⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
+−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +− θφ
σθ                      (39) 
 
3.3 – Real Exchange Rate Dynamics 
The equation describing the dynamic behaviour of the real exchange rate is derived by combining 
the log–linearized version of equation (15) with equation (28). The log-linearized equation (15) is:  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ttttttttttttt uuEbqqEccEccE −+−−+−=− ++∗∗++ 1111 11 σσκσ                                 (40) 
 Write equation (28) one period forward and substitute in equation (40) to get: 
  
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )tttt
ttttttttt
uuE
w
ab
w
a
yyE
w
ayyE
w
aqEq
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
−+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
−−
−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+
−+−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+
−−=
+
∗∗
+++
1
22
111
1
1
1
1
1
)1(
1
)1(
κ
σσ
        (41) 
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 Expressing equation (41) in gap-form provides a dynamic equation for the real exchange rate: 
  ( ) ( ) ( )00 1211 111 )1( tttttttttt qqEbwaxxEwaqEq −−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
−−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+
−−= +++ κσ         (42) 
where 0tq  is given as: 
  ( ) tttt uwayywaq ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
−−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+
−= ∗
1
)1(
1
)1( 200 σ                        (43) 
 
3.4 – Net Foreign Assets-Current Account Dynamics 
 Finally, the dynamic equation for net foreign assets can be had by log-linearizing equation (12). 
First, it would be convenient to re-write equation (12) in real terms as: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ttttt t NXbbi
b ++=+
−
−∗
1
1 11
πφ             (44)  
where, tNX stands for net exports and equals: 
  tt
t
tH
t CYP
P
NX −= ,              (45)  
The log-linearized version of equations (44), after making use of the 
relationship, ttHt qa
a ∆⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−+= 1,ππ , is given as:  
  ( ) tttHttt nxqa
abib 1
1
)1( ,1 −+∆⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−−−+=+ −
∗ βπβκβ                      (46) 
The log-linearized version of equations (45), after making use of equation (28) to eliminate tc , is:  
  ( ) ( ) tttt qa
hy
a
ay
a
anx ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−= ∗ 3
2
2 111
21
          (47) 
where, )1()2(2 aaaah −−−= η .  
 To be consistent with the rest of the model, I express equations (46) and (47) in gap-form to get: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]0 1010,1 1)1( −−− −−−⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −−−⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛ −+−= tttttttHtt qqqqananxnxnnnbb ββπ        (48) 
where, 
)1(
1
κβ +=n  
 16
  0032 )()1()1(
21
ttttt nxqqa
hx
a
anx +−⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−+⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−=           (49)              
where, 
  ( ) ( ) 03
2
0
2
0
111
21
tttt qa
hy
a
ay
a
anx ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−= ∗           (50) 
 
4 – The Behaviour of Monetary Authority 
To evaluate the welfare implications of alternative monetary policy rules and exchange rate 
regimes a welfare criterion (SW) is defined in terms of the central bank’s loss or objective function, 
which can be derived as an approximation of the representative households utility function. The objective 
function thus serves as a guide for the monetary authority to evaluate alternative monetary policies. 
Section 4.2 compares a variety of alternative (non-optimal) policy rules using this benchmark criterion. 
 
4.1 - Optimal Monetary Policy 
In simple words optimal monetary policy means that, given the dynamic general equilibrium 
structure, the effects of all sources of sub-optimality/economic distortions are fully neutralized and the 
constrained efficient equilibrium is restored. There are numerous sources of economic distortions present 
in the model summarized above with incomplete asset markets and sticky prices.  
First, market power distortion caused by monopolistically competitive firms that charge a 
constant mark-up. Following Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and Gali and Monacelli (2002), I assume 
that government fully offsets the market power distortion by subsidizing employment, which is financed 
through lump sum tax on households. This assumption ensures that the central bank has no incentive to 
increase the economy’s output beyond the level corresponding to flexible prices and thus the classic 
inflation bias problem is assumed away.  
Second, nominal rigidity in goods prices introduced in a staggered fashion that causes suboptimal 
variation in prices across firms. In this case the optimal policy would require that real marginal costs (and 
thus markups) are stabilized at their steady state level, which in turn implies that domestic prices be fully 
stabilized. The intuition for that result is straightforward but holds only in a closed economy setting: by 
stabilizing markups at their “frictionless” level, nominal rigidities cease to be binding, since firms do not 
feel any desire to adjust prices. By construction, the resulting equilibrium allocation is efficient, and the 
price level remains constant.  
  In an open economy, there is an additional factor that distorts the incentives of the monetary 
authority (beyond the presence of market power and nominal rigidities): the possibility of influencing the 
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terms of trade and thus the real exchange rate in a way beneficial to domestic consumers. This possibility, 
pointed out by Corsetti and Pesent (2001a), is a consequence of the imperfect substitutability between 
domestic and foreign goods. However, Following from Woodford’s (2002) derivation of a benevolent 
monetary policy maker’s objective function from agents utility, a number of papers (Aoki (2002), 
Sutherland (2002), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2001), Batini, Harrison, and Millard (2003), and De Paoli 
(2004)) have suggested that policy in an open economy should have the same objectives as in a closed 
economy, and in particular that the exchange rate should play no role. For example, Aoki (2002) 
considers a two sector model, where prices in one sector are completely flexible, and shows that it is only 
inflation in the non-flexible sector that is relevant for welfare. He explicitly suggests that imported goods 
in an open economy are akin to the flexible price sector, and that therefore the price of imported goods 
(and by implication the exchange rate) should not appear in the objective function of the central bank 
representing welfare. 
However, all these papers invoke the assumption of complete asset markets. What would happen 
in case of incomplete and imperfect international asset markets? Presence of incomplete asset markets 
causes imperfect risk-sharing and may lead to shifts in wealth across countries. Kirsonova, Leith, and 
Wren-Lewis (2004) derive the objective function of the central bank from the utility function of the 
households and show that when there are shocks to international risk sharing, the exchange rate appears 
alongside output and inflation in the social welfare function. Benigno, P. (2001) reached a similar 
conclusion in a model with incomplete asset markets and argued that since there are trade-offs among 
several distortions, it is optimal to distribute the losses across different uses. 
Based on the above discussion, I can define the social welfare function as:
 ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡−= ∑∞
=
+
02
1
k
kt
k
t LESW β                    (51) 
where tL  stands for the period ‘t’ loss function of the central bank that takes the output gap tx , domestic 
inflation tH ,π , and the real exchange rate gap, 0tt qq −  as the target variables: 
( )202 ,2 )( ttqtHtxt qqxL H −++= απαα π             (52) 
where
Hx παα , and qα ’ is the weight that the policy authority places on output, domestic inflation, and 
real exchange rate deviation from their respective level under flexible prices and complete asset markets.  
After taking unconditional expectations, the loss function becomes: 
 ( ))var()var()var()( 0, ttqtHtxt qqxLE H −++= απαα π          (53) 
where )var(),var( ,tHtx π and )var( 0tt qq − are the unconditional variances of domestic inflation, the 
output gap, and the real exchange rate gap, respectively. 
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An important point to note about the real exchange rate term is that it is in the form of deviation 
from the level that would occur with no nominal price rigidities and zero net foreign assets. That is, the 
exchange rate gap term in the loss function is the difference between actual exchange rate disequilibrium 
and the disequilibrium that would occur with no distortions, not the change in the exchange rate (the 
assumption normally employed in the literature, e.g., Kollmann (2002)). A change in exchange rate term 
makes no attempt to allow for ‘warranted’ exchange rate movements i.e. natural disequilibrium. 
   
4.2 - Monetary Policy Rules  
Faced with different kinds of shocks, the monetary authority uses the short-term nominal interest 
rate ti  as its policy instrument to maximize the social welfare subject to the constraints implied by the 
structure of the model. The central bank manages this interest rate according to an open economy variant 
of the Taylor-type feedback rule.11 In particular, I analyze the macroeconomic implications of two 
alternative monetary policy regimes: domestic inflation targeting and CPI inflation targeting, and 
considers both flexible and dirty floating regimes. The analysis also contrasts differences between strict 
and flexible inflation targeting. The general form of the open economy Taylor-rule is given as: 
  ( )0ttqjttxt qqxi −++= λπλλ π             (54) 
where jtπ could be domestic inflation or CPI inflation depending on the targeting regime considered. 
πλλ ,x and qλ  are the weights associated with stabilizing output gap, inflation rate (around zero), and the 
real exchange rate around the flexible price/complete asset market real exchange rate level respectively. 
The value of parameter qλ implies the type of exchange rate regime that the monetary authority 
chooses. For example, 0=qλ means that the central bank does not care about deviations of the real 
exchange rate from the target, i.e., the economy has a flexible exchange rate. On the other hand, 0>qλ  
means that the central bank responds by changing the interest rate if there is some deviation of the real 
exchange rate from its target value. Thus, this case corresponds to a managed exchange rate, and as 
∞→qλ , to a fixed exchange rate. 
 
5 – A Numerical Analysis of Alternative Monetary-Exchange Rate Policies 
This section presents quantitative results based on a calibrated version of the model economy12. In 
particular, I report the variances for key variables and the expected loss of the central bank under 
                                                 
11 For similar work, see Guender (2001), Leitmo and Soderstorm (2001), and Taylor (2001).  
12 The model is calibrated and simulated by using the technique provided by Soderlind (1999). The software used for 
this purpose is MATLAB. 
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alternative monetary-exchange rate regimes. These experiments allows us to compare the effects of 
alternative targeting regimes on key macroeconomic variables (output gap, inflation and real exchange 
rate) within the dynamic general equilibrium framework developed in the paper.  
 
5.1- Calibration 
For parameter values, standard baseline values that appear in the related literature (e.g., Gali and 
Monacelli (2002)) are chosen. The value for 99.0=β  implies a risk-less annual return of about 4 
percent in the steady state. 1=σ  is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution which corresponds to log 
utility. 3=φ , which implies a labor supply elasticity of 1/3. The elasticity of substitution between 
domestic and foreign goods,η , equals 1.5. The baseline value for ‘ a ’ (or degree of openness) is assumed 
to be 0.4, which roughly corresponds to the import/GDP ratio in a typical small open economy. Parameter 
ρ  is set equal to 0.75, a value consistent with an average period of one year between price adjustments. 
‘κ .’ is assumed to equal 0.0007. In general, the main conclusions do not differ with alternative 
reasonable parameter values. 
The variances for the white noise taste, technology, and foreign output shocks are taken to be 
0.000175 with a persistence parameter of zu ρρ ,5.0= and 65.0=∗yρ . Taken together these numbers 
imply an annualized standard deviation of approximately 6% for the model economy. The values chosen 
for the variances of the shock have a direct effect on the absolute magnitude of expected losses, but do not 
influence the relative magnitudes of the losses; it is the relative losses that are relevant for comparison.  
 
5.2 – Analysis: Discussion of Results 
Two types of aggregate shocks are considered: taste shocks and foreign output shocks. 
 
5.2.1 – Taste Shock 
Table 1 reports the results for domestic inflation targeting (DIT) with alternative exchange rate 
policies in response to taste shocks. The numbers in blue correspond to flexible domestic inflation 
targeting (FDIT) while the numbers in red are for strict domestic inflation targeting (SDIT). A number of 
very interesting results can be observed.  
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Table 1: Taste Shock --- Domestic Inflation Targeting (DIT) 
 
 
          )var( tx            )var( ,tHπ  )var( tq               1Loss   2Loss   
  
     FDIT     SDIT     FDIT     SDIT     FDIT    SDIT    FDIT      SDIT    FDIT     SDIT 
     
 
 0=qλ       3.60      5.09       0.150    0.070    431.18   418.89   215.99  212.10   0.405     2.65                                                 
 
 5.0=qλ   0.052     2.31       0.015    0.192    344.02   273.03  172.06   137.96   0.049     1.44 
 
  0.1=qλ   0.750     31.93    0.173     2.52     283.44   207.80   124.35  123.64   0.634     19.75 
 
  5.1=qλ   5.292     83.54    1.276     8.12     239.96   170.64   142.54  139.27   4.561     53.95 
 
 
0=qλ  corresponds to the flexible exchange rate regime, while 0.1,5.0=qλ and 5.1 capture alternative degrees 
of dirty floating or managed exchange rate regime. FDIT stands for flexible DIT with 5.0=xλ  and 5.1=Hπλ while SDIT 
stands for strict DIT with 0=xλ  and 5.1=Hπλ . 1Loss  corresponds to the value of social welfare function with 
5.1,5.0 ==
Hx παα and 5.0=qα , whereas 2Loss  corresponds to the case when 5.1,5.0 == Hx παα and 
0=qα .   
 
First, managed exchange rate regime is superior to flexible exchange rate regime under domestic 
inflation targeting: the expected loss goes down as the central bank places some weight on stabilizing the 
real exchange rate. However, it is important to note that as the central bank tries to stabilize the real 
exchange rate ‘too much’, that is, approaches fixed exchange rate case, loss increases. This result is quite 
robust and holds regardless of the welfare criterion used: loss1, which includes real exchange rate 
movements, or loss2, which focuses only on output gap and inflation movements. Also, the result remains 
unchanged whether the central bank adopts flexible inflation targeting or strict inflation targeting. For 
example, under both flexible and strict inflation targeting, as the parameter ‘ qλ ’ changes from 0 to 1.0 
loss1 decreases, but, as ‘ qλ ’ approaches 1.5 or higher, loss1 increases. In case where welfare criterion, 
loss2, is considered, increasing ‘ qλ ’ from 0 to 0.5 decrease it, but as ‘ qλ ’ approaches 1.0 or higher, it 
increases.  In other words, whether central bank cares about real exchange rate movements or not, placing 
some positive weight on stabilizing it pays off as it lowers the volatility in output gap and domestic 
inflation. At the same time, stabilizing real exchange rate too much increases their volatility.  
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The key reason behind this unique and powerful result is the presence of current account 
dynamics affecting not only the real exchange rate behaviour via imperfect risk sharing due to incomplete 
asset markets, but also the output gap via the risk premium term in the interest parity relationship. The 
intuition is as follows. Suppose the economy experiences a positive taste shock that tends to push up both 
output gap and domestic inflation and causes some appreciation of the real exchange rate. A typical 
response would be to increase the nominal interest rate, which leads to further appreciation that helps the 
transmission mechanism. In a model without current account dynamics (zero net foreign assets) the 
analysis would stop here and predict that the central bank can completely stabilize shocks that push up 
output gap and domestic inflation in the same direction implying flexible domestic inflation targeting 
with completely flexible exchange rate as the optimal monetary policy. (e.g., Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 
(2001). On the other hand, in the presence of net foreign assets, there would be ‘excess’ appreciation due 
to a taste shock: an appreciation improves the net foreign asset position that in turn causes further 
appreciation (see, equation (42) and (48)). In this case, increasing the interest rates would exacerbate the 
excess appreciation. Therefore, placing some positive weight on stabilizing real exchange rate, by 
lowering the interest rate, eliminates this excess appreciation leading to welfare improvements. Put 
differently, appreciation (caused by increasing the interest rate) may eliminate the impact of the taste 
shock on the output gap, but a consumption gap would remain due to incomplete risk sharing, and so a 
less aggressive response by the policy authority (a slight cut in interest rates to moderate the appreciation) 
will enhance welfare. However, the policy should not try to eliminate the real exchange rate gap 
completely by lowering the interest rates too much as it may lead to large output gaps; some exchange 
rate gap may well be necessary to avoid these gaps and improve welfare. 
This result also challenges the conventional wisdom --- the famous insulation property of flexible 
exchange rate regime --- that flexible exchange rate is better compared to ‘targeted’ exchange rate in case 
of real shocks such as taste shocks. Some exchange rate targeting --- a dirty float --- turns out to be a 
superior outcome. 
Another stark result reported in table 1 is that strict domestic inflation targeting is slightly better 
than flexible domestic inflation targeting or at least the difference is very small compared to what is 
usually reported in the literature. The intuition for this result is simple. Strict domestic inflation targeting 
means that the central bank does not care about output gap movements. Thus, the implications of an 
‘excess’ appreciation for the output gap, as discussed above, is not binding, which induces the central 
bank to stabilize the real exchange rate gap more. This implies lower losses if the welfare criterion used is 
loss1. If the welfare criterion used is loss2, as in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2001), however, the opposite 
result would hold not so surprisingly.     
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Apart from comparing social welfare across alternative monetary-exchange rate policies, a careful 
inspection of output volatility and domestic inflation volatility also reveal some unconventional results. 
For example, a conventional model predicts that in the presence of nominal price rigidities, flexibility of 
exchange rates (the famous over-shooting result) ensures lower output volatility. However, the volatility 
of output decreases, in my model, as the central bank moves to dirty floating. The reason is as follows. A 
positive taste shock leads to excess appreciation via dynamic interaction between real exchange rates and 
net foreign assets, which causes output volatility. Eliminating this excess appreciation, by stabilizing the 
real exchange rate slightly, therefore, would reduce output volatility. Similarly, the predictions of the 
model regarding inflation volatility are also unconventional. A standard model suggests that inflation 
volatility goes down as the economies move towards fixed exchange rates. Indeed, a famous argument in 
favour of fixed exchange rate regime is that it pins down the inflation expectations leading to lower 
inflation volatility. This is not the case in my model that boasts rich dynamic interactions among net 
foreign assets and inflation, real exchange rates and output gap (see last row in table 1).  
  
Table 2: Taste Shock --- CPI Inflation Targeting 
 
 
          )var( tx            )var( tπ   )var( tq               1Loss   2Loss   
  
     FCPI     SCPI     FCPI     SCPI       FCPI    SCPI      FCPI      SCPI    FCPI     SCPI 
     
 
 0=qλ       9.83      84.95      17.30    11.66   253.75   205.72  157.74   162.82   30.87     59.96                                               
 
 5.0=qλ   19.11     124.13    15.50    13.19   222.26   175.87  143.92  169.78    32.80     81.85 
 
  0.1=qλ   32.30    169.78   15.77     17.04   197.16   153.73  138.38   187.31   39.80    110.45 
 
  5.1=qλ   49.34    220.08   17.65     23.06   176.80   136.61  139.54   212.93   51.14    144.63 
 
 
0=qλ  corresponds to the flexible exchange rate regime, while 0.1,5.0=qλ and 5.1 capture alternative degrees 
of dirty floating or managed exchange rate regime. FCIT stands for flexible CPI inflation targeting with 5.0=xλ  and 
5.1=πλ while SCPI stands for strict CPI inflation targeting with 0=xλ  and 5.1=πλ . 1Loss  corresponds to the 
value of social welfare function with 5.1,5.0 ==
Hx παα and 5.0=qα , whereas 2Loss  corresponds to the case when 
5.1,5.0 ==
Hx παα and 0=qα .   
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Table 2 reports the results for CPI inflation targeting with alternative exchange rate policies in 
response to a taste shock. Before discussing any result, an important point need to be made regarding the 
difference in CPI inflation targeting and domestic inflation targeting with managed exchange rates. In line 
with conventional wisdom, Parrado (2004) argues that if an economy has a managed exchange rate there 
is no difference in CPI and domestic inflation targeting as the volatility in key macroeconomic variables 
is the same across these regimes. The reason, pointed out by Parrado (2004), is that targeting the CPI 
inflation is the same thing as targeting both domestic inflation and the exchange rate, which is equivalent 
to targeting domestic inflation with managed exchange rates.  
However, an important point need to be noted about the real exchange rate term as it appears in 
the policy rule in this paper. The point is that, like output, it is in the form of deviation from the level that 
would occur with no nominal price rigidities and international risk sharing shocks like net foreign assets, 
and not in change form. That is, unlike the traditional models that study CPI inflation targeting and role of 
exchange rates in policy rules, the analysis presented in the paper suggests terms in exchange rate ‘gap’: 
the difference between actual exchange rate disequilibrium and the disequilibrium that would occur with 
no distortions. Not only is the dimension of this expression different from the change in the exchange 
rate, but a change in exchange rate term makes no attempt to allow for ‘warranted’ exchange rate 
movements i.e. natural disequilibrium. This distinction is important in understanding the results reported 
in Table 2. 
The first result is that flexible CPI inflation targeting with managed exchange rates is superior to 
flexible CPI inflation targeting with completely floating exchange rates. That is, responding to real 
exchange rate gap in addition to CPI inflation (that implicitly incorporates response to exchange rate 
changes) is welfare improving. Put differently, responding to exchange rate changes alone (as embedded 
in the response to CPI inflation) is not enough to improve welfare. An additional response to exchange 
rate gap leads to better outcomes. However, this result does not hold when either an alternative welfare 
criterion, loss2, is used or strict CPI inflation targeting is pursued.  Thus, the case for dirty floating is not 
that strong as was the case with domestic inflation targeting. The reason for this is not too difficult to 
understand. In the case of domestic inflation targeting, stabilizing real exchange rate eliminates the excess 
appreciation that follows due to a taste shock, and thus improves welfare. On the hand, with CPI inflation 
targeting, response to real exchange rate is already included in the regime; responding to real exchange 
rate gap on top of this would be harmful as it leads to excess output volatility. 
Another result is that, unlike the domestic inflation targeting case, flexible CPI inflation targeting 
is always superior to strict CPI inflation targeting regardless of the welfare criterion used because strict 
inflation targeting dramatically increases the output volatility. Similarly, in line with conventional 
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wisdom, output volatility indeed goes up as the economy moves towards more managed exchanged rates. 
However, a point worth noting is that no noticeable gain is made on the volatility of CPI inflation.  
Note that a direct comparison between domestic inflation targeting and CPI inflation targeting 
can not be made because their respective loss functions involve different arguments (domestic inflation in 
one and CPI inflation in other). 
 
Table 3: Foreign Output Shock --- Domestic Inflation Targeting (DIT) 
 
 
          )var( tx            )var( ,tHπ  )var( tq               1Loss   2Loss   
  
     FDIT     SDIT     FDIT     SDIT     FDIT    SDIT      FDIT      SDIT    FDIT     SDIT 
     
 
 0=qλ      0            0             0           0           17.721   17.56    8.861     8.778       0            0                                                  
 
 5.0=qλ   0.001     0.038     0.002    0.009    15.251   13.891   7.629    6.978     0.003     0.033 
 
  0.1=qλ  0.020     0.335     0.020     0.076   13.417   11.642   6.749      6.103    0.040    0.282 
 
  5.1=qλ   0.091    0.903     0.075     0.241    11.976   10.185   6.147     5.905    0.160    0.812 
 
 
0=qλ  corresponds to the flexible exchange rate regime, while 0.1,5.0=qλ and 5.1 capture alternative degrees 
of dirty floating or managed exchange rate regime. FDIT stands for flexible DIT with 5.0=xλ  and 5.1=Hπλ while SDIT 
stands for strict DIT with 0=xλ  and 5.1=Hπλ . 1Loss  corresponds to the value of social welfare function with 
5.1,5.0 ==
Hx παα and 5.0=qα , whereas 2Loss  corresponds to the case when 5.1,5.0 == Hx παα and 
0=qα .   
  
 Table 3 reports the results for foreign output shock with domestic inflation targeting. A positive 
foreign out put shock, by decreasing the flexible price real interest rate leads to a negative output gap and 
thus lower domestic inflation. Also, it causes real exchange rate appreciation. The central bank responds 
by lowering the nominal interest rate that leads to real depreciation. This, in turn, pushes up the output 
gap and domestic inflation to their original level. Thus, both output and domestic inflation are completely 
stabilized under flexible exchange rates. Unlike the response to taste shocks, this policy does not lead to 
‘excess’ appreciation due to dynamics of real exchange rate and net foreign assets because a cut in the 
interest rate dampens the real appreciation rather than exacerbating it. Therefore, as the central bank 
moves towards the managed exchange rate regime volatility of exchange rate decreases, but at the same 
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time output and domestic inflation volatility increases. Thus, the difference between loss1 across 
alternative exchange rate regimes is very insignificant. Obviously, if loss2 is used as a welfare criterion 
then flexible exchange rate regime would be superior. 
 Comparing flexible DIT with strict DIT under managed exchange rates reveal a rather surprising 
result. Volatility of domestic inflation increases under the strict case. With lower real exchange rate 
volatility and higher output volatility, loss1 is actually slightly lower under strict DIT compared to 
flexible DIT. This is the same result as observed in case of taste shocks. Essentially, central bank trades-
off some inflation volatility for lower real exchange rate volatility in case the welfare criterion includes 
real exchange rate gap terms, such as loss1. Needless to say, flexible DIT would be superior if welfare 
criterion, loss2 is used.   
  
Table 4: Foreign Output Shock --- CPI Inflation Targeting  
 
 
          )var( tx            )var( tπ   )var( tq               1Loss   2Loss   
  
     FCPI     SCPI     FCPI     SCPI     FCPI      SCPI      FCPI      SCPI    FCPI     SCPT 
     
 
 0=qλ      0.16       1.168     0.633    0.507    12.843   11.667   7.451     7.177      1.03     1.344                                               
 
 5.0=qλ   0.293    1.655      0.610    0.564    11.678   10.428   6.901     6.887     1.062    1.673 
 
  0.1=qλ   0.489   1.886     0.658      0.612    10.709   10.013   6.586    6.868     1.231    1.861 
 
  5.1=qλ   0.703   0.197      0.745     0.689    10.013    9.848    6.476    6.852     1.470      1.88 
 
 
0=qλ  corresponds to the flexible exchange rate regime, while 0.1,5.0=qλ and 5.1 capture alternative degrees 
of dirty floating or managed exchange rate regime. FCIT stands for flexible CPI inflation targeting with 5.0=xλ  and 
5.1=πλ while SCPI stands for strict CPI inflation targeting with 0=xλ  and 5.1=πλ . 1Loss  corresponds to the 
value of social welfare function with 5.1,5.0 ==
Hx παα and 5.0=qα , whereas 2Loss  corresponds to the case when 
5.1,5.0 ==
Hx παα and 0=qα .   
 
 Similar results hold in case of CPI inflation targeting except that output and inflation are not 
completely stabilized and inflation volatility does not increase in case of strict CPI targeting. As before 
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dirty floating is slightly better than flexible exchange rates but the result is not quite robust if welfare 
criterion, loss2, is used.  
 
 
6 - Concluding Remarks 
The paper developed and analyzed a dynamic general equilibrium model with staggered price 
rigidities and incomplete and imperfect international asset markets. The key contribution of the paper is 
that it allows for the dynamic relationship between real exchange rate and net foreign assets to affect the 
dynamics of domestic inflation and output gap. Thus, unlike other similar open economy models, for 
example, Gali and Monacelli (2002) and Clarida Gali and Gertler (2001), this paper has shown that the 
dynamics of domestic inflation and output gap does not have a canonical representation analogous to 
closed economy models, and therefore the optimal monetary policy design problem for an open economy 
is not ‘isomorphic’ to a closed economy. Furthermore, relying on the recent literature that formally 
derives the welfare criterion or the loss function for an open economy (e.g, Kirsonova, Leith, and Wren-
Lewis (2004), Benigno and Woodford (2004), and Benigno (2001)) as an approximation to the 
representative agents’ utility function, the paper has also shown that this loss function is not analogous to 
the one applying to the corresponding closed economy. In particular, due to the current account dynamics, 
the loss function also includes the real exchange rate gap term in addition to domestic inflation and output 
gap. This implies that in general targeting domestic inflation with flexible exchange rate would not be the 
welfare maximizing optimal monetary policy. 
The framework is then used to study various monetary-exchange rate policies using Taylor-type 
interest rate based rules. In particular, I compare the performance of domestic inflation targeting and CPI 
inflation targeting with flexible and managed exchange rate regimes. Moreover, I also study flexible and 
strict inflation targeting considering both inflation indices. The main results of the paper are: (1) - 
Managed exchange rate regime (dirty floating) is superior to flexible exchange rate regime under 
domestic inflation targeting. Volatility in both output and domestic inflation goes down and so does the 
volatility in real exchange rate. Put differently, there is no trade-off between stabilizing the real exchange 
rate and domestic inflation and output gap: welfare improves as the central bank places some weight on 
stabilizing the real exchange rate and pursues domestic inflation targeting. (2) - As the central bank tries 
to stabilize the real exchange rate ‘too much’, that is, approaches fixed exchange rate case, loss increases. 
(3) - In case of a taste shock, this result is quite robust and holds regardless of the welfare criterion used: 
whether it includes real exchange rate movements, or focuses only on output gap and inflation 
movements. (4) - Also, the result remains unchanged whether the central bank adopts flexible inflation 
targeting or strict inflation targeting. (5) - Strict domestic inflation targeting outperforms flexible 
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domestic inflation target regardless of the exchange rate regime. This result is sensitive, however, to the 
welfare criterion used. (6) - With CPI inflation targeting, there is some evidence in favour of ‘dirty 
floating’, however, the result is not that robust when alternative welfare criterion is used. (7) - Flexible 
CPI inflation targeting dominates strict CPI inflation targeting, and is not sensitive to the welfare criterion 
used.  
The bottom line is that the dynamic relationship between net foreign asset position and the real 
exchange rate plays a crucial role in obtaining the above mentioned results.  
These results, while suggestive, are subject to some limitations. For instance, introducing imports 
as production inputs, ala McCallum and Nelson (2000), with rigidities in the import prices could alter the 
conclusions as to the appropriate exchange rate regime or price index to target.  Similarly, introducing 
labour market rigidities could alter the results as well. After all, as pointed out by Erceg, Henderson and 
Levin (2000), the simultaneous presence of both forms of nominal rigidity introduces an additional 
tradeoff that renders ‘goods’ price inflation targeting policies suboptimal. Therefore, it may be interesting 
to analyze how that tradeoff would affect the ranking across monetary-exchange rate policy regimes 
evaluated in the present paper. These results would also need to be qualified, if one considers differences 
in price-setting across various markets, as in the case of less than complete exchange rate pass-through of 
nominal exchange rate changes to prices of imported (or exported) goods. Moreover, since the various 
currency crises episodes in the 1990s much of the discussion on exchange rate policy in emerging market 
economies is concerned with the interaction of exchange rate with balance sheets, borrowing constraints, 
dollarization of liabilities, and creditworthiness of firms. Incorporating such consideration in a model with 
imperfections in the financial markets, such as the one developed in this paper, should certainly be the 
focus of future research. 
Finally, the paper deals with calibrated results. Conclusions about policy dominance and welfare 
consequences depend on a specific parameterization, and they should not be taken as general 
propositions. The paper experimented sufficiently with alternative parameterization to be confident that 
the results presented here are robust to relatively minor changes in assumptions. More work is clearly 
warranted, however, before making general policy recommendations.  
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